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Abstract 
This paper examines the contribution of investments in Information Technology (IT) and in 
advertising to the output and profits of Spanish banks, in the period 1983-2003. We find that 
the growth in the stock of IT capital explains one third of output growth of banks, and that an 
additional investment in IT of one million euros may be substituted for twenty-five workers. 
The paper also finds that advertising investments increase the demand for bank services 
with an elasticity of 0.22 for deposits and 0.11 for loans. For all the assets considered, the 
null hypothesis that banks use the profit-maximizing amount of services per period cannot 
be rejected with the data. 
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1 Introduction 
Information technology (IT) and advertising capital increasingly substitute physical capital and 
labor in the production and sale of banking services. Data on Spanish banks used in this 
paper show that the average stock of IT capital per bank, in 2003, is ten times larger than 
what it was in 1983; in the same period, the average stock of capital accumulated through 
advertising expenditures has been multiplied by a factor of 2.4. However, the average stock 
of physical capital, and the average number of employees per bank in year 2003, is 1.6 times 
that of 1983. Economics and business scholars have expressed concern about the true 
contribution of large investments in IT capital to the productivity and profitability of firms,1 but, 
somewhat surprisingly, the consequences of the shift towards a more intensive use of 
immaterial assets in banks have not been given much attention in the literature.2 
This paper models the multi-branch, multi-asset banking firm and examines 
contributions to the productivity and profitability of services from labor, and from a list of 
capital inputs, including physical (branches), information technology (IT) and advertising 
capital. The model specifies if a particular input is valuable for the bank because it increases 
production (i.e. it is a production function input), because it increases the demand for loans or 
the supply of deposits for a given price, or both. We use data from the confidential 
accounting statements of Spanish banks during the period 1983-2003, to test the 
assumptions on the production technology, on the demand function of bank services, and on 
the profit-maximizing conditions of the use of services from labor and capital inputs. In the 
process, the paper provides estimates of the production and demand elasticity of input 
services, and of the price elasticity of demand for bank loans and deposits. In addition to 
providing new evidence on the contribution to productivity and profitability of investment in 
immaterial inputs of IT and advertising, the paper also tests for scale economies at the branch 
and at the bank level. 
The paper contributes to the literature on the productive efficiency and efficient 
resource allocations of banking firms [see e.g. Berger et al. (1997)] in several ways. First, it 
expands the list of banks’ operating inputs considered in previous research (labor and 
physical capital), adding the capital services from IT and advertising capital. The stocks of 
capital inputs are valued at replacement cost and the services used in production or in 
increasing demand are valued at the users’ costs of capital (financial opportunity costs plus 
depreciation). Second, the paper presents a new formulation the production technology of 
banking services at the branch and the bank level (Leontieff-type production function), which 
is tested for constant returns to scale at the branch and at the bank level. Third, the 
                                                                          
1. The so-called “productivity paradox”, namely the apparent small contribution of large investments in computers and 
information technologies (IT), to aggregate productivity growth in developed economies [see e.g. Brynjolfsson (1993); 
for a review], fostered the use of firm-level data to investigate whether IT capital did in fact contribute to the efficiency 
and profitability of firms [Lichtenberg (1995); Brynjolffsson and Hitt (1995 and 1996); Dewan and Min (1997); 
Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002)]. The controversy about IT and growth has been even more intense at the macro 
level; see for example Oliner and Sichel (2000), for a review. Lim, Richardson and Roberts (2004) provide a general 
assessment of research findings on the effects of IT investment in firm performance before, and after, the mid 
nineteen-nineties. 
2. The papers on the consequences of IT investments in banking we are aware of are Parsons, Gotlieb and 
Denny (1993) in Canadian banking, Prasad and Harker (1997) in US retail banking, Casolaro and Gobbi (2004) in Italian 
banking and Beccalli (2007) for a sample of European banks. Beccalli (2007) also refers to reports from the Council of 
Economic Advisors and the McKinsey Global Institute that find weak links between IT spending and productivity 
for US banks. Pinho (2000) documents the increase in advertising expenditures by Portuguese banks after the market 
was liberalized. 
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production function of banks is estimated using the GMM-system method [Blundell and Bond 
(1998)]; the use of standard panel data econometric techniques in production functions 
estimation gives unreasonably low estimates of the elasticity of output to capital and, 
consequently, leads to erroneous conclusions about the existence of constant returns to 
scale in production [Griliches and Mairesse (1998)].3 
Our model of the banking firm assumes product differentiation [Hannan (1991)], so 
banks decide price and non-price variables to maximize profits [Pinho (2000)]. However, the 
interest of the paper is not in explaining differences in profits across banks, but to evaluate if 
observed quantities of capital and labor inputs deployed by banks contribute to the 
productivity and/or total output of banking services. It also studies whether the return to 
capital invested from such a contribution is higher or equal to the input unit cost. In this 
respect, the paper applies to the banking firm the general firm-level analysis of the 
contribution of computers to productivity and profitability [Lichtenberg (1995); Brynjolffsson 
and Hitt (1995)], but with several extensions: i) inputs can affect both production of and 
demand for bank services, ii) banks have market power, iii) and the estimations of production 
and demand functions are performed using advanced econometric techniques. The paper 
also differs from Beccalli (2007), who studies the effect of IT investment (flow) in the 
performance (profitability and efficiency) of European banks. We explicitly model and test 
whether IT capital (stock) affects the production and/or demand of banking services; we then 
estimate the elasticity of the output with respect to the IT capital and, finally, check whether or 
not the return on invested IT compensates for the user cost of the input, using the optimal 
conditions implied by the formal model. 
 Using data from Spanish banks during the period 1983-2003 we find that: i) Bank 
branches produce services under a Leontieff-type technology with two inputs, physical capital 
(in the form of the capacity of the branch) and services from the combination of labor and IT 
capital. Physical capital (capacity) per branch is a quasi-fixed production input, while services 
from labor and IT capital are combined under constant returns to scale at branch level. 
ii) Production of banks is proportional to the number of branches, so the hypothesis of 
constant returns to scale at the bank level is not rejected. iii) The demand for banking services 
decreases with the price (market power), and increases with the advertising capital and with 
the number of bank branches (accessibility), but it is not affected by the IT capital. 
iv) The growth in IT capital during the period 1989 to 2003 contributes to one third of the 
growth rate of the aggregate output of banks (sum of loans and deposits). In addition, 
one million euros of investment in IT capital substitutes for 25 workers, maintaining the same 
level of output. v) Banks’ expenditures in production and demand-enhancing inputs are 
consistent with those predicted by a profit-maximizing model, i.e. we find no evidence of 
under- or over-investment of banks. 
Section 2 provides the conceptual and theoretical foundations for the cost-benefit analysis 
of investment in a profit-maximizing framework, where inputs can be production-enhancing, 
value-enhancing or both. Section 3 presents the data base, Spanish banks, and statistics on 
the quantity and cost of inputs, on output quantity and on interest rates. Section 4 of the 
paper contains the results of the empirical analysis, including the estimation of production 
and demand functions, and the test of the profit-maximizing conditions. Section 5 contains a 
discussion and conclusion from the main results. 
                                                                          
3. The existing research in the topic also includes several papers on the efficiency of Spanish banks, Grifell-Tatje and 
Lovell (1996), Kumbhakar et al. (2001), Lovell and Pastor (1997), Maudos (1996). None of them focus on the particular 
issues of contribution to output and value of bank assets addressed in our paper. 
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2 The basic model 
2.1  Definition of inputs and outputs 
In the literature, there are at least three different approaches to the definition of inputs, 
outputs and production technology of banks [Berger and Humphrey (1992 and 1997)]: the 
production function approach, the intermediation approach and the value-added approach. 
In the production function approach, banks use labor and capital (inputs) that vary with the 
number of loan and deposit accounts (physical output). In the intermediation or assets 
approach [Mester1(987)], the output of the bank is the money balance of the loans, so the 
driver of the input demand is the amount of euros that the bank grants as loans. The inputs 
are labor, capital and money balance of deposits. Finally, in the value added approach, the 
output of the bank includes all the activities that provide services that consumers are willing 
to pay for. These services are often grouped in two areas: first, direct services (such as 
liquidity provision, payments, brokerage, guarantees, securities keeping,…) and second, 
services from the pure intermediation activity (i.e., raising and lending funds). As financial 
intermediaries, banks exploit economies of scale in transaction technologies, and manage 
the information needed to cope with the adverse selection and moral hazard problems that 
arise in financial transactions (monitoring and screening borrowers, setting debt covenants, 
evaluating assets pledged as collateral). These activities consume inputs and generate costs 
that banks must pay for [Benston et al. (1982)]. In addition, banks consume resources in 
opening branches to provide customers accessibility to the services they demand.4 
The model of the banking firm used in this paper draws from these different 
approaches. The final result is a particular case of the model of the product-differentiated 
banking firm, proposed by Hannan (1991), but with special attention to modeling production 
as well as demand functions. As in the production function approach, our model assumes 
that both loans and deposits are output of banks, but it also considers that money balances, 
and not the number of accounts, are a better proxy for the range of banking services; in other 
words, output per account increases with the amount of the account balance. The output of 
the bank is then measured by the sum of money balances of loans and deposits. In our 
model, bank services are provided at the branch level, so the output and inputs of the bank 
are equal to output/inputs per branch, times the number of branches.5 
Branches provide physical space for workers, computers and other physical 
infrastructure needed to produce output. The opening of a branch requires an investment in 
physical capital that is scaled to its local geographic market, mainly determined by a cap in 
                                                                          
4. There exists an additional approach to the production activity of banks called the user cost approach, 
[Hancock (1991)]. Here a bank product is considered an output if it contributes to the revenues of the bank and an 
input if it subtracts revenues, where the contribution is measured by the difference between financial return 
and opportunity cost. In general, this approach assigns loans to output, but is ambiguous in terms of deposits, where 
time deposits are classified as inputs and demand deposits as outputs.  
5. This measure of output is also used by Prasad and Harker (1997) but they do not model bank behavior. Papers differ 
in the choice of inputs and outputs of the banking firm; in particular, whether bank deposits are considered 
input [Aly et al. (1990)] or output [Casolaro and Gobbi (2004)] of the bank. Other papers consider deposits as inputs 
and outputs at the same time. Hunter and Timme (1995) treat deposits first as inputs and then as outputs, 
to evaluate the efficiency in the banking sector. On the other hand, Berger and Humphrey (1991) have captured this 
double nature of deposits, introducing the interest rate paid in deposits in the cost function, but also including 
the quantity of deposits in the output of banks as a proxy for the services they provide. Another resource that has both 
input and output characteristics is the number of bank branches. In this sense, branches may be considered as 
part of the physical capital that contributes to generate the output of the bank, but they may also be thought 
of as an output in themselves, since they provide a better service to costumers [Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (1996)]. 
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customers’ transportation costs to that branch. Within a given territory, and for a given 
distance between bank branches, a larger network of branches will increase the value of 
banking services for customers and, for a given price it will increase the demand for banking 
services. Therefore, bank branches increase both the production capacity of the bank and the 
customers’ value of the services. This implies that branches can be considered, 
simultaneously, an input of the production function and an input of the demand function of 
banking services. 
The branch provides customers with services from the combination of labor and IT 
capital. Higher demand in the branch will require more workers and more IT hardware and 
software to serve the customers. IT capital, as well as better-trained workers, may increase 
the value of services for customers and as a result increase their willingness to pay for them. 
For example, banks can install ATM machines in their branches and speed up some services 
through customer self-service, which may be valued by the customer. More IT capital can be 
a way to expand the scope of services that a customer can get from one particular branch, 
i.e. it facilitates one-stop banking that, again, saves in transportation costs and increases 
customer value. This suggests that IT capital can, on the one hand, increase the production 
capacity and/or substitute labor in the branch and, on the other hand, increase the value of 
banking services provided by the particular bank. Therefore, the paper considers that IT 
capital is an input of both the production and the demand function, while labor is only a 
productive input that increases the production capacity of the banks. 
In addition to labor, branches (physical capital) and IT capital, the paper includes an 
additional input called Advertising capital. The stock of this capital refers to the information, 
reputation and other intangible services provided by regularly-implemented advertising 
campaigns. Demand-capital from advertising is assumed to provide services at the bank level 
and, therefore, the stock of services will benefit all branches of the bank. Assets accumulated 
through advertising expenditures are a value-increasing input (it increases the customers’ 
willingness to pay for the bank services), but not a productive input and, consequently, 
they will be an input in the demand function but not in the production function.6 
2.2 Production, demand and profit-maximizing problem 
Consider a bank that issues equity, E, collects deposit, D, grants loans, L, and borrows/lends 
in financial or interbank markets, BO. In order to collect deposits and to grant loans, the bank 
employs physical capital (K), IT capital (IK) and workers (N). Since the services attached to 
these loans and deposits are provided in each branch, the inputs and outputs of banks have 
to be first defined at the branch level and then aggregated to the bank level. To open a 
branch requires an investment in physical capital equal to kb. The investment is fixed and 
standard across branches (the opening of a branch requires a minimum investment 
independent of the demand) and the size of the relevant market is limited by the customers’ 
transportation costs. The investment per branch determines the capacity of the outlet. Define 
the number of workers per branch (nb) and IT capital per branch (ikb) as the variable inputs 
                                                                          
6. The inputs used by banks can also be grouped into material (labor, computers and physical space) and immaterial 
(accessibility to branches, variety of services inside the branch, information and reputation capital). This grouping is 
useful to relate our results to others in the literature on contributions to productivity and value from tangible 
and intangible assets. The main focus of interest in this literature has been to evaluate the contribution of IT capital to 
productivity and growth, and to investigate whether or not such contribution brings about an external (intangible) effect 
that produces extraordinary profits. Often, IT –as well as advertising capital– is included as part of the intangible 
inputs of the firm. However, this paper follows the approach of Lev (2001) and Cummins (2004) who limit the 
“intangible capital” to that produced internally and “results from the distinct way firms combine the usual factors 
of production” [Cummins (2004)]. The static approach to profit maximization followed in the paper excludes internally- 
generated intangibles, and the only distinction that can be made is between material and immaterial assets. 
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which can be substituted among themselves, but not with the physical capital. For a given 
number of branches B and assuming constant returns to scale at the bank level, the total 
output of the bank, equal to the sum of loans (L) and Deposits (D), is written as follows.  
 ( ){ }[ ]bbb iknFkBDL ,,min⋅=+  (1) 
 
Therefore the branch production technology is of the Leontieff-type with a 
given investment in fixed capital and limited capacity. The function F ( ) is assumed to 
be an increasing, concave and linear homogeneous function (constant returns to scale) 
in the two variable inputs, labor and IT capital.7 Since F ( ) is linear homogeneous, the 
equation (1) can be formulated as, 
 
DLkB b +≥⋅  (2) 
( ) DLIKNF +≥,  (3) 
 
Where N=Bnb and IK=Bikb are the total number of workers and total invested IT 
capital of the bank. Investment per branch kb is assumed to be a constant, so the 
total capacity of the bank varies proportionally to the number of branches. In solving 
the model, it is assumed that branches do not operate at full capacity [restriction (2) 
is non-binding]. On the other hand, the number of workers and IT equipment are variable 
inputs that can be adjusted to the demand of the branch [constraint (3) will be binding]. 
Banks operate in monopolistic competition markets. The bank faces a 
negatively-sloped interest-rate demand function of loans, ( )B,IK,CK;rLL l=  where rl is the 
interest rate, and a positively-sloped interest-rate supply function of deposits, 
( )B,IK,CK;rDD d= , where rd is the interest rate on deposits. According to the hypothesis on 
value-enhancing inputs, for a given interest rate, demand and supply increase with the stock 
of advertising capital CK, with the stock of IT capital IK, and with the number of branches B. 
Stocks of money values of financial and productive assets are related as follows: 
 
EDBOLCKpIKpKp ckikk ++=+++  (4) 
aLCKpIKpKpE ckikk +++=  (5) 
 
where K=Bkb; and pk, pik, pck are the market prices of one unit of service from the respective 
capital asset. Equation (4) postulates that total assets are equal to total liabilities, where BO 
(trade in the interbank or money market) can be positive, negative or zero. Equation (5) 
                                                                          
7. The assumption that output of the bank is proportional to the sum of loans and deposits simplifies the exposition. 
With some complications in the algebra and in the empirical estimation, it could be substituted for by a more general 
aggregation function of the two outputs, G(L,D). 
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indicates that bank equity is used to finance the stock of all assets used in production and 
sales, plus a fixed proportion of loans equal to a>0, determined by regulatory requirements.8 
Banks draw services from the stock of assets in place during their productive life. 
These services are valued by the bank in terms of the rental or user cost of capital [Jorgenson 
(1963)] which we identify by ck,, cik,, cck, for physical, IT and advertising capital, respectively. 
Appendix 1 provides an explanation of how the user’s cost of capital is calculated. Salary per 
worker is w. The interbank market is perfectly competitive at the interest rate i and the 
financial cost of equity is α, which, in general, will be higher than the market interest rate 
because of the risk differential between the two alternatives (see Appendix 1). Credit risk and 
other uncertainties faced by banks are not explicitly modelled. However, as indicated in 
Appendix 1, the user cost of capital is calculated for each bank, assuming a financial 
opportunity cost of equity that includes a risk premium from credit risk (charged in the interest 
rate of loans) and from financial risk (which depends on the leverage of the bank). Riskier 
banks are penalized with higher cost of equity. 
Taking into account (1), (4) and (5) and the other assumptions, the profit-maximizing 
behaviour of the bank is written as, 
 ( )( )[ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) wNCKpcIKpcBkpcBIKCKrDriBIKCKrLaairMax ckckikikbkkddllNCKIKBrr dl −−−−⋅−+⋅+−− ,,;,,;1,,,,, α  
   ( ) ( ) ( )IKNFBIKCKrDBIKCKrLtos dl ,,,;,,;. =+  
 
A more detailed derivation of the first order conditions of the problem is presented in 
Appendix 2. In the main text, we highlight the results that will be tested in the empirical 
section. The first refer to the value of the Lerner index in the profit maximizing solution, 
 
dd
d
ll
l
er
ri
er
mr 1;1 =−−=−− λλ
 
(6) 
 
Where λ is the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint, m = [I (1-a) + aα] is the financial 
opportunity cost of loans, and el and ed are the absolute values of loan and deposit demand 
price elasticity. 
The second optimality conditions refer to optimal expenditures on advertising capital 
(CK) and the number of branches (B), i.e. the value-enhancing inputs. 
 
d
CKD
D
l
CKL
L
dl
ckck
eeDrLr
CKpc ,, Σ+Σ=+ νν
 
(7) 
                                                                          
8. Equation (5) could be formulated assuming that regulatory capital is set equal to a proportion of the total assets (loans 
plus tangible and intangible assets) of the bank, i.e. 8% according to Basel I. This would imply that the financial 
opportunity cost of tangible and intangible assets will be equal to the weighted average financial cost of interbank 
finance and equity finance, but the basic model would not change.  The equation is written as an equality because the 
cost of equity is higher than the interbank rate; thus, in the optimal solution, banks will choose the minimum equity 
required. 
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L
dl
bkk
eeDrLr
Bkpc ,, Σ+Σ=+ νν
 
(8) 
 
Where 
DrLr
Lr
dl
l
L +=ν , vD = 1- vL; ΣL,CK (ΣL,B) and ΣD,CK (ΣD,B) are the loan and deposit demand 
elasticity with respect to Advertising capital (Branches), respectively. Equations (7) and (8) 
correspond to the well-known Dorffman-Steiner (1954) theorem, originally formulated in terms 
of the optimal advertising expenditures for a monopolistic firm. They say that in the profit 
maximizing solution the ratio of user’s costs in advertising capital and branches must be 
equal, respectively, to the weighted ratios of the input elasticity and the price elasticity of 
demand for loans and for deposits (the weights being the respective ratios of interests 
of loans and interests of deposits over total interests). 
Finally, the profit-maximizing shares of input costs for IT capital and labour are given 
by: 
 
[ ]IKDLIKDLikikIK ATCIKpcS ),(),( 1 ++ Σ−⋅+Σ==  (9) 
[ ]NDLNDLN ATCwNS ),(),( ++ Σ⋅−Σ==  (10) 
 
where
ace
s
ace
sA IK,D
d
DIK,L
l
L ΣΣ += , sL= L/(L+D), sD=1-sL; ΣL+D,N and ΣL+D,IK are the output 
elasticity (from the production function) with respect to labor and IT capital, respectively. 
TC = cik pik IK + w N is the total operating cost of the bank from the labour and IT capital 
inputs and ac=TC  (L+D) is the average unit operating cost. Notice that, as expected, 
the two shares of costs add up to 1 since the sum of elasticity is also equal to one 
(linear homogeneous production function). Equations (9) and (10) capture the external effect 
of IT expenditures in increasing demand for banking services. If such external effects did not 
exist, A = 0 because IK,LΣ  = IK,DΣ  = 0, then the optimal cost shares would be just equal to 
the respective output elasticity of the input. However, under external effects, the share of 
expenditures in IT capital is augmented (relative to the share of labour expenditures) 
by the factor A, which determines the contribution of IT capital to profits through the increase 
in the value of banking services. 
2.3 Related literature on IT investment, productivity and profitability 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1995 and 1996) and Lichtenberg (1995) use firm-level data to test 
whether IT capital contributes to the growth and profit of firms. To do so, they formulated two 
null hypotheses that, using the notation above, can be written as: i) 0≤≡ + IK),DL(oH Σ ; and 
ii) 
N
IK
N),DL(
IK),DL('
o S
SH ≤≡
+
+
Σ
Σ
. If Ho is rejected, the alternative hypothesis implies that the elasticity of 
output to IT capital is positive and, therefore, expenditures in IT capital contribute to output 
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growth. On the other hand, the rejection of 'oH  means that IT capital contribution to output is 
higher than what it costs relative to other non-IT inputs (in our case, labor).9 
The two hypotheses are formulated assuming that firms operate in a competitive 
output market and choose profit-maximizing (and cost-minimizing) quantities of inputs (that is, 
quantities satisfy that the marginal productivity is equal to the user cost of the input). 
No details are provided on why the share of IT expenditures over total expenditures for all 
inputs should deviate from the share that would result from profit maximization. The only 
explanation is a reference to externalities similar to those observed in R&D activities, together 
with the possibility that the information system had the effect of increasing the average skill 
of workers, reducing the probability of mistakes and increasing productivity. 
This paper suggests that one possible externality is that IT capital affects both output 
and demand. In this case, (9) and (10) imply, 
 
NDLNDLNDL
IKDL
N
IK Aac
A
A
S
S
,,,
, 1
1 +++
+
Σ=Σ⋅−=Σ
Σ− λ
 
(11) 
 
Since the optimal λ has to be positive for an interior solution, the right-hand side of 
(11) will be positive. Therefore, if banks take into account the external effect of IT capital on 
demand for banking services, the ratio of the optimal expenditures in IT capital, relative to the 
optimal expenditures on labour, is expected to be higher than the ratio of the respective 
output elasticity. Therefore, (11) provides theoretical support to 'oH  proposed in the literature: 
When IT increases the demand of bank services, as well as output from the production 
function, profit- maximizing banks will spend more on IT than they would if IT is only an 
input of the production function. 
Prasad and Harker (1997) apply the methodology proposed by Brynjolfsson and 
Hitt and by Lichtenberg, to evaluate the contribution of IT capital to productivity and to 
profitability in US retail banking. In addition to H0 and H’0 Prasard and Harker formulate an 
additional hypothesis (their H1b) that, using our notation, would be written as 
0>−−+−+ ik
ik
dl
IK),DL( cIKp
D)ri(L)mr(Σ . If this hypothesis is not rejected, then the gross return 
from the invested IT capital (IK) will be higher than the user cost of the IT capital and, 
consequently the IT capital generates extraordinary (economic) profits for banks. Our model 
provides an explanation of why H1b postulated by Prasard and Harker can be satisfied under 
standard profit maximizing behaviour of banks. Assume that A=0, that is, IT capital does not 
contribute to increase the value of banking services. Then, from Appendix 2,10 
 ( )
0, =−+Σ + ik
ik
IKDL c
IKp
DLλ
 
(12) 
 
                                                                          
9. An alternative but equivalent formulation of the hypothesis of excess returns from IT investment is that marginal 
productivity of invested capital in IT be higher than user cost of IT capital [Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1996)]. These authors 
assume that firms do not have market power. 
10. Equation (12) is equivalent to equation (A.4) of the Appendix 2 under A = 0. 
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Where λ is equal to average operating cost, ac, (from labour and IT capital). If banks 
have market power, the gross profits from loans and deposits will be higher than the average 
operating costs; that is D)ri(L)mr( dl −+−  > ( )DL +λ . Therefore, a sufficient condition for 
Prasar and Harker’s hypothesis to be satisfied is that banks have market power. Moreover, 
with market power, the condition that states that the gross return from investment must be 
higher than the opportunity cost of capital will be satisfied for any input, not only for IT capital. 
The remainder of the paper will concentrate on testing the assumptions and 
implications of the model presented in section 2.2. The test includes the hypothesis on the 
production function (constant returns to scale in IT capital and labour at the branch level, 
and constant returns to scale at the bank level), on the demand function (branches, 
advertising capital and IT capital are value-enhancing resources), and on optimal 
(profit-maximizing) use of labour and of all forms of capital. 
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3 Data sample and estimation methodology 
3.1 Database 
The data base for the empirical analysis comes from the population of Spanish commercial 
and saving banks in the period 1983 to 2003 (around 200 banks that represent 95% of the 
banking system; the rest belong to the credit cooperatives for which most of the data 
needed are not available). The raw data from accounting statements of banks had to be 
transformed in order to obtain values of bank assets at replacement costs. A systematic 
methodology is applied to obtain the user cost of capital for each asset and bank over time. 
Martín-Oliver, Salas and Saurina (2007b) provide a detailed description of how the variables 
used in this analysis have been constructed; we present a summary of the methodology 
in Appendix 1. 
Table 1 shows the year by year statistics (mean, median, standard deviation) of the 
number of banks and output variables used in the production function estimation. Although 
the theoretical analysis assumes that the output was equal to the loans plus the deposits, the 
estimation will be replicated, for purposes of robustness, including in the output of banks the 
present value of the flow of net commissions in period t.11 This stock is identified as 
Commissions. 
The number of banks decreases from 159 in 1983 to 91 in 2003, due to mergers 
and acquisitions. Part of the increase observed in mean and median values of the output per 
bank, at constant prices, responds to this decline: taking into account the growth rates of the 
numerator and the denominator, the aggregate output (including Commissions) of all banks 
at constant prices grows at average annual rates of 3.61% in 1983-1989, 2.09% (5.36-3.27) 
in 1989-1994, 5.36% in 1994-1999 and 4.09%, in 1999-2003. Notice also that the median 
value of output is always lower than the mean; hence, the size distribution of banks reflects 
that there are a relatively larger number of small banks than of big banks. 
Table 2 provides information about the inputs of banks: physical capital, advertising 
capital and IT capital, all at 1983 prices, and the number of workers. We consider two 
measures of physical capital, the amount of euros invested (stock), and the number of 
branches. Once again, to properly interpret the values shown in the Table, we must take into 
account the decrease in the number of banks over time shown in Table 1. Physical capital in 
euros shows an erratic evolution, with positive and negative growth rates in alternate five-year 
periods, while the number of branches steadily increases over time at a rate higher than the 
decline in the number of banks (except in 1999-2003, where the number of branches 
per bank grows at a rate of 6.5%, similar to the decrease in the number of banks). IT capital is 
the input with higher growth rates, while the total number of workers (per bank, times the 
number of banks) remains fairly stable until 1999, but decreases at an annual rate of 2.3% 
(4.21-6.50) in the period 1999 to 2003. Spanish banks substitute IT capital for labor as 
productive inputs, in line with the evidence for firms in the non-financial sectors reported by 
Dewan and Min (1997). In the twenty-year period, the mean of the stock of IT capital per bank 
has increased ten times, while the mean of the number of workers has increased by a factor 
of less than two. 
                                                                          
11. To obtain a measure of output for commissions, we have worked out, in each time period, the present value of a 
permanent flow of income with a nominal equal to the current flow of net commissions, and a discount factor equal to 
the interbank interest rate
t
it
it Interbank
CommisionsNetFlow
sCommission =  
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The description of the data is completed with Table 3, which shows the statistics of 
the real cost of equity, the real user cost of capital of the assets, the cost of labour and some 
representative interest rates of loans and deposits (available only from 1988), also in real 
terms. The cost of equity is an estimate of the financial opportunity cost of the resources 
invested by shareholders (calculated for each bank taking into account the interest rate of its 
loans and the financial risk from its leverage position); the user cost of capital is equal to the 
estimated nominal cost of equity of the bank plus the depreciation rate of the asset 
(assumed to be the same for all banks) and minus the inflation rate in the price of the asset.12 
On the other hand, the representative interest rates are credit lines, mortgages, personal 
loans and receivables for loans, and term deposit and REPO operations for deposits. These 
rates correspond to the new operations made by the bank in the respective year 
(not averages for the stock of loans or deposits).13 In advertising and IT capital, where 
depreciation rates are high, the user cost remains rather stable over time, even though 
the equity costs decrease due to lower interest rates over time. The figure of the user cost 
reported in the table, around 0.47 for IT capital, is in line with that used in other papers 
[Lichtenberg (1995); Dewan and Min (1999)]. This decline is more evident in physical capital, 
where the depreciation rate is much lower. Labor cost per worker, at constant prices, remains 
stable from 1989 to 1998, and increases slightly in the last five-year period. 
3.2 Empirical models and estimations 
Profit-maximizing conditions for bank inputs are formulated in terms of cost shares and ratios 
of costs over revenues, as well as price and non-price elasticity in production and demand 
[equations (7) to (10)]. Moreover, such conditions vary depending on whether a particular 
input affects the production function, the demand function, or both. Then, the first step of the 
empirical analysis will be to estimate the production and demand functions, which will provide 
answers to the posed questions. 
From binding equation (3), the production function of the bank determines output 
(loans plus deposits) as a function of the IT capital and the number of workers. The function 
that aggregates the quantities of inputs into output is assumed to be Cobb-Douglass. After 
taking logs on both sides of the equation, the production function to be estimated can be 
written as follows,14 
 
υβββ ++++=+ CVNIKDL lnln)(ln 210  (13) 
 
where βj is the output elasticity of input j . Constant returns to scale impose the condition 
that β1+β2=1. On the other hand, if the physical capital was introduced as an explanatory 
variable in the regression, its estimated coefficient should be zero, since all the variations in 
output are captured by variations in the other inputs in the Leontieff technology. The control 
variables, CV, will include time dummies, while the error term υ  will include time-invariant 
bank fixed effects, measurement errors and productivity shocks with a long-lasting effect. 
                                                                          
12 See details in Martin-Oliver, Salas and Saurina (2007b), as well as in the Appendix 1 of this paper. 
13. The interest rates on loans and deposits corresponding to transactions performed during the month are reported 
monthly by each bank to the Banco de España. Martín-Oliver, Salas and Saurina (2007a) provide details on this source 
of data. 
14. L+D, IK and N per branch are multiplied by the number of branches, so that output and input are bank-level 
variables. 
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The demand equations that we consider are derived from multiple-choice models, in 
which consumers observe and compare different products (banks) and choose the one that 
maximizes their utility. Berry (1994) shows that the demand function of each product (bank) 
can be written, under certain conditions,15 in terms of the log of market share (logit equation) 
as follows, 
 
iiii pxss ξαβ +−=− 0lnln  (14) 
 
where si  represents the share of loans (deposits) of bank i with respect to the size of 
the potential market, M, and s0 stand for the proportion of the population M that does 
not buy banking products (outside good). On the right-hand side of the equation, xi refers 
to the observable characteristics of bank/product i, pi stands for its price (interest rate) 
and ξI captures the unobservable attributes of i that affect consumer utility. A negative 
price-elasticity is assumed for loan products and a positive elasticity for deposits (supply). 
3.3 Estimation methodology  
Considering the problems that arise in this estimation using the standard GMM estimator 
[Griliches and Mairesse (1998)], the production and demand functions will be estimated 
following the estimation procedure proposed by Blundell and Bond (1999). The model to be 
estimated is written in the abbreviated form: 
 
)( ititit
Jj
jj
itnit mvkny itk +++++= ∑∈ ηγββ  (15) 
ititit evv += −1ρ  ;    | ρ | < 1  
)0(~, MAme itit      J =  {Physical, IT}  
 
where yit is the log of the output of bank i in year t, nit is the log of the number of workers, 
kitJ is the log of the capital stock of type J, and t is a time dummy variable that captures 
common shocks over time. Finally, in the error component, i stands for individual effects of 
the banks, mit captures potential measurement errors (uncorrelated) of the explanatory 
variables and, finally, vit reflects productivity shocks, whose impact in time lasts longer than 
one period. The condition of constant returns to scale (CRS) implies ∑ =+
∈Jj
j
kn 1ββ . 
The empirical model can be rewritten in a dynamic (common factor) representation 
form because of the persistence of the productivity shocks: 
 
                                                                          
15. The assumptions are: i) no random coefficients (β is constant across costumers); ii) εij identically and independently 
distributed across products and consumers with the extreme value distribution function; and iii) mean utility of the 
outside good normalized to zero. 
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(16) 
 
Renaming the respective coefficients and grouping the error components, 
( )1−−= tt*t γργγ  , ( )ρηη −= 1i*i , itititit emmw +⋅−= −1ρ  we obtain the equation to be 
estimated, 
 
)( **513211 14 it
Jj
jj
Jj
jj
itititit wkknnyy ititit +++++++= ∑∑ ∈∈−− − ηγπππππ  (17) 
 
The vector of Π must satisfy five restrictions (common factor restrictions; from here 
referred to as COMFAC restrictions) in order to guarantee that the output is generated 
according to the production function defined in (1). The constraints that must be tested are 
213 πππ ⋅−= and jj 415 πππ ⋅−=  for j∈ J; J= {Physical, IT}. Following Blundell and Bond (1999), 
in a first step we estimate the unconstrained specification of the model (17) using the 
System-GMM estimator and then, if the COMFAC restrictions are empirically satisfied, 
we obtain the restricted estimations of the original parameters of (15), using the minimum 
distance estimator.16 
The overall goodness of the estimations will be evaluated through the validity 
of the moment conditions (Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions) and the test of the 
null hypothesis of absence of second-order autocorrelation of the residual term 
(first order autocorrelation is expected since we take first differences in the variables). In the 
case of measurement errors of the inputs, (mit), second order autocorrelation is expected, 
because of the process MA(1) in the error term, and the validity of the estimation will lie 
in the absence of autocorrelation of  third and higher order. 
The same econometric approach will be applied to the estimation of the demand for 
loans and the supply of deposits, where the quantity demanded (supplied) of loans (deposits) 
is a function of the quantity of inputs such as advertising capital, IT capital and branches, as 
well as a function of interest rates on loans (deposits). Demand and supply functions will also 
be affected by external shocks. 
                                                                          
16. Minimum distance is an estimation technique to obtain a vector of coefficients restricted to a set of conditions based 
on the unrestricted estimation. The restricted coefficients θ solve the problem [ ] [ ]''
c
)c(sVˆ)c(sminargˆ ωωθ −−= −1 , 
where s is the vector of unrestricted coefficients, ω (c) is the vector of conditions that the restricted coefficients are to 
accomplish, and  Vˆ  is a consistent estimator of the variance-covariance matrix of the unrestricted coefficients. For a 
detailed explanation of this technique, see Arellano (2003). 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 22 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0740 
4 Results 
4.1  Production function 
The results of the production function estimation, equation (16), are shown in Table 4. 
In all the specifications, the unrestricted estimations [the first step of the estimation 
procedure, equation (17)] show no problems in their validity tests, (the p-values of the Sargan 
and second-order autocorrelation statistics are comfortably above 5%). The same applies for 
the restricted estimation [second step to obtain the original parameters, equation (15)], 
since the p values of the COMFAC restriction are close to 1.17 
The estimated coefficients reveal that productivity shocks in banks are highly 
persistent (the estimated coefficient of yt-1 is around 0.88). Column (I) shows the results of the 
basic model, including labour and IT capital as explanatory variables. Column (II) shows 
the results when physical capital is included as an additional explanatory variable. Finally, 
Column (III) reports the results when inputs are normalized by the number of branches, and 
the number of branches is also one of the explanatory variables. In Column (I), the estimated 
elasticity of labour and IT capital in the restricted model are, respectively, Σ(L+D),N = 0.867 
and Σ(L+D),IK = 0.212, both statistically significant at 5% or less. The sum of the two estimated 
elasticities is 1.079, which explains why the condition of constant returns to scale 
(Σ(L+D),N + Σ(L+D),IK = 1) cannot be rejected (p value of 0.576 in the CRS row). Adding physical 
capital, K, as an explanatory variable leaves the remaining results practically unchanged and 
the estimated coefficient of the new variable is not statistically different from zero [Column (II)]. 
If we substitute physical capital by the number of branches as the third explanatory variable, 
the results (not shown) are identical. Therefore, the hypothesis that physical capital is a 
quasi-factor of the production and the hypothesis that the banking production function is of 
the Leontieff-type are not rejected by the empirical evidence. 
The last column in Table 4 explains the total output of banks as a function of the 
labour and the IT capital per branch and of the number of branches. The estimated coefficient 
of the number of branches can be used to test for constant returns to scale at the bank level, 
depending whether the value of the coefficient is equal to 1 or not. The results show an 
estimate of the elasticity of the number of workers, and of the IT capital per branch, of 0.803 
and 0.205, respectively, both significant at 1%. The null hypothesis that the sum of the 
elasticity is equal to 1 is not rejected (existence of CRS), which coincides with the result 
from Column (I). The results of Column (III) also show that the elasticity of the output to the 
number of branches is 0.986; the null hypothesis of elasticity equal to 1 cannot be rejected. 
Therefore, the production technology of banks appears to describe the relationship 
between inputs and outputs at the branch level, while the output of the bank is simply output 
per bank times the number of branches. With this result, the constant returns to scale apply 
also at the bank level.18 
                                                                          
17. Neither the Sargan test nor the 2nd order autocorrelation test are satisfied when the model is estimated using 
the first-differences GMM estimator (estimations not reported). Moreover, the parameters estimated for labour, nt, 
and capital jtk  are lower than those estimated with the system GMM, confirming the predictions of Blundell and 
Bond (1999) and casting doubts on the validity of the model. 
18. The production function has been estimated allowing for differences in the output mix of banks, i.e. allowing for 
different elasticity coefficients for banks that specialize in family lending (high retail orientation) and banks that specialize 
in business lending (low retail orientation). We generate a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for banks where loans 
to families represent 10% (25%) or less of the loans to firms and zero otherwise. The estimated coefficients of the 
dummy variable times the number of employees and the stock of IT capital were not significantly different from zero in 
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The final test is of the hypothesis that bank branches require a fixed investment per 
branch, and the resulting physical capacity is greater than actual production per branch. 
The production function to be estimated is formulated from equation (2). If the equation is 
binding, then the log of output (loans plus deposits) can be written as a function of the log of 
physical capital per branch and the log of the number of branches. The GMM system 
estimation of the model gives an estimated coefficient for physical capital per branch of 0.03, 
not significantly different from zero (p value of 0.72). Therefore, we conclude that the output 
of banks is independent of the capacity per branch, which validates the assumption that bank 
branches do not operate at full capacity.19 
In all the estimations, the elasticity of output with respect to IT capital 
is approximately 25% as large as the elasticity of output with respect to labour 
(0.212/0.867 = 0.25). Since the per-bank median value of the ratio amount of IT capital 
to number of workers is around 10,000 euros (Table 2), all this implies that the marginal rate 
of substitution between labour and IT capital, evaluated at the median values of the variables, 
is 25∙10-6 (0.25/10,000): that is, a one-million euro increase in the stock of IT capital implies a 
reduction of 25 workers, according to the results of the model.20 
4.2 Loan demand and deposit supply 
Equation (14) is estimated separately for total loans and for total deposits of each bank 
in the sample, following the same procedure as in the production function (the static 
formulation of (14) can be extended to panel data, adding a sub-index t in all the variables). 
The vector xj includes the number of branches, advertising capital, and IT capital for each 
bank; interest rates pj are averages of marginal interest rates of bank loans and deposits 
of bank j (see descriptive information on interest rates provided in Table 3) 21. Here, we also 
consider the possibility of persistence in the shocks of demand, that is, ξit follows an 
autoregressive process and the estimation will then be performed using the same GMM 
system methodology.22 
                                                                                                                                                 
either of the estimations. It should be noticed that banks whose family loans represent 25% or less of their business 
loans account for 7% of the total assets, which implies that banks in the sample do not show very high differences in 
product mix. A second robustness test has been to check the time stability of the production function. The production 
function has been estimated for the period 1983-1992 and for the period 1993-2003. The estimated elasticities in the 
two periods are quite similar and the null hypothesis of stability in the production function could not be statistically 
rejected. Finally, Hughes, Lang, Mester and Moon (1996) contemplate differences in the risk of the production plan of 
banks and evaluate how not considering these differences in the estimation may bias the production function estimates. 
The production function has been estimated allowing for differences in elasticity for banks above and below the median 
in the distribution of the intensity of IT and Advertising capital (considering that different intensity of the inputs may be 
tied to different risk in production plans) and, once more, the estimated elasticity is not different in one group of banks 
versus the other. 
19. The model under Column (I) in Table 4 has been estimated using Loans + Deposits + Commissions as an alternative 
measure of output instead of Loans+ Deposits alone (not reported). The elasticity of labour and IT capital are 0.855 
and 0.226, respectively, both statistically significant at 1% and less. The estimated elasticities are somewhat larger than 
when only loans and deposits are included in the output of banks, but the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale is 
not rejected. 
20. This result is not inconsistent with the cost-benefit analysis of the investment in IT to substitute workers. For a user 
cost of capital of 0.47 (Table 3), a one-million euro investment in IT implies a total user cost of IT capital per year 
of 470,000 euros. The equivalent cost per worker and year of this user cost is close to 20,000 euros (470,000/25), in line 
with average labor cost per worker in the period. 
21. We have assumed that the size of the potential market for loans (deposits) is equal to the monetary value of all the 
operations in the banking market, times a factor or proportionality equal to the inverse of the number of loans (deposits) 
per household (average of 80%). Data on the number of operations is available but incomplete, since they do not 
fully integrate the whole amount of loans or deposits that a bank produces. Therefore, our estimation of M is an 
approximation of the true measure. 
22. In the estimation of the demand function, we take special account of the potential endogeneity of the interest rates 
(the residuals may capture shifts in consumers’ preferences, which modify the price, generating a correlation between 
residuals and interest rates) and of the number of branches (demand and branches might be mutually determined). 
In the estimations, the lags of interest rates and the number of branches have been substituted by two additional 
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Table 5 shows the results of the estimation using data for the 1988-2003 period 
(information on interest rates is restricted to this time period). The table also includes the 
p-values of the statistics on the validity of the specification, including COMFAC restrictions. 
These p-values are all comfortably above the critical value of 5%, confirming the overall 
statistical validity of the estimations.23 
The estimated coefficients are all significantly different from zero, except for IT 
capital. According to this result, no evidence is found from the data that IT is a 
value-enhancing input, in the sense that it increases the demand of bank services for a given 
interest rate. The estimated elasticity to number of bank branches is equal to 0.41 in deposits, 
and 0.31 in loans24.  Advertising capital also contributes to demand in a statistically significant 
way, with an estimated elasticity of 0.22 in deposits, and half of that, 0.11, in loans. Demand 
for loans is negatively associated with the interest rate: the estimated interest rate elasticity 
of loans is ).).(..(. 0710401175345345 ⋅−⋅−=−− . The supply of deposits increases with the 
interest rate, with an estimated elasticity of 2.27 [2.27 = 2.32∙(1-0.05)∙1.03]. Demand 
for loans is more price sensitive than the supply of deposits. This may be due to the fact that 
deposits include saving and current accounts that provide liquidity and payment services 
to customers and, presumably, the deposit balances for liquidity and payment services are 
highly price-inelastic.25 
Equation (6) indicates that, at the profit-maximizing interest rates and marginal costs, 
the price elasticity of loans (in absolute terms) and the price elasticity of deposits are inversely 
related to relative profit margins (not of variable operating costs) of banks. Therefore, they are 
an inverse measure of market power. With an estimated price elasticity of around five for 
loans and around two for deposits, the relative profit margins of banks are, approximately, 
20% in loans and 50% in deposits.26 
4.3  Implications for output growth, costs and profits 
Having investigated the contribution of inputs to production and demand of banking services, 
this section presents the results from the tests of the profit maximizing conditions. In other 
words, we examine if inputs earn the expected return according to the respective unit cost or, 
alternatively, they earn some form of extraordinary profit or loss (which would be evidence 
of under or over investment relative to profit maximizing values). The exposition begins 
                                                                                                                                                 
sets of instruments. One is the residuals from the production function estimated above, since any shock that 
affects the supply side will also affect the level of interest rates (correlation with the explanatory variables of the 
demand function) but will be independent of shocks in consumers’ preferences (uncorrelated with residuals of 
the demand function). The other instrument is the predicted number of branches as a function of the number of workers 
and IT capital at the bank level; as this prediction will be uncorrelated with the residual term of the demand function. 
This latter instrument is based on the fact that if u)x(fy += , 0≠)u,x(corr and there is a variable z that 
satisfies vzx ++= δγ ; 0≠)v,u(corr ; then the predictions zˆˆxˆ δγ += are valid instruments for x in 
u)x(fy += . 
23. In the demand for loans function, the presence of 2nd order autocorrelation cannot be rejected at 5%. 
As we explained at the end of the previous section, these results may be due to the presence of measurement errors. 
Then, the valid instruments have to be lagged one period of time, and the goodness of the estimation is reflected 
in the third-order autocorrelation test.  
24. The elasticity of the market share with respect to x is ( ) ii
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 0.43∙(1-0.05 )since branches enter the equation in logs. 
25. Internet banking can change these results in the future, although during the period of study, and for the vast majority 
of banks, electronic banking has been irrelevant.  
26. Demand for loans and deposits has been estimated allowing for differences in elasticity for banks with relatively more 
and less specialization in retail banking, using the same measure as in the production function (note 18). The null 
hypothesis of equal elasticity in the two groups of banks could not be rejected.  
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with IT capital, the input that has generated most interest in the literature to date. No empirical 
evidence was found in the previous section supporting the notion that IT capital is a 
value-enhancing input, in the sense of increasing demand for banking services (controlling for 
interest rate, branches and advertising capital). This evidence would be consistent with the 
hypothesis that, during the period under investigation, banks’ investments in IT have not 
increased customers’ willingness to pay for services, even though IT capital has contributed 
significantly to the production of these services. According to the results in Table 4, the 
elasticity of output to IT capital is positive and statistically significant, so that a one hundred 
percent increase in IT capital increases output by 21.2% [SYSTEM (I)]. IT capital is a 
productive input of banks, in line with evidence found in other studies that also use firm-level 
data [Lichtenberg (1995); Brynjolffsson and Hitt (1995 and 1996)], but our estimate of the 
elasticity of output to IT capital is more than twice that obtained in those papers. 
Data from Table 2 on growth rates of IT capital over time permit us to obtain the 
contribution of growth in this capital to total output growth. Growth in IT capital is particularly 
high during the first five years of the period, 1983-1989, with average annual growth rate in 
the stock of IT close to 18% in real terms. During the period 1989 to 2003, IT capital grows at 
an average annual rate of 4.8% (9% of growth per bank and -4.2% of decline in the number 
of banks). Weighting this growth rate with the elasticity of output to IT capital (equal to 0.212), 
the contribution of IT capital growth to aggregate bank output growth from 1989 to 2003 
is equal to 1.0 % per year (0.048·0.212). Given that the average annual growth rate of 
aggregate bank output in the same period is 3% (7.2% per bank and -4.2% declines in the 
number of banks (Table 1), IT capital growth explains 33% (1.0% out of 3%) of the rate of 
output growth in the past fifteen years. The contribution of IT capital to the growth of 
banking output is therefore quite substantial, and compares well with that obtained in 
studies focusing on other economic sectors. From Tables 1 and 2, growth in total number of 
workers is practically zero in all five- year periods, except for the last one, when it was 
negative. The remaining 2% in annual average growth of output, not explained by 
the increase in IT capital, is then the residual or total factor productivity growth from the 
combination of labor and IT capital to produce bank services.27 
In line with the concerns expressed in the literature, it is important to distinguish 
between productive and profitable investments in IT capital. An input is productive when it 
contributes to output, and it is profitable when it contributes to economic profits. Profitability 
implies that the return of investment is at least equal to the cost of capital or, alternatively, that 
the share of input cost in total cost is not higher than the elasticity of output to the respective 
input [equations (9) and (10) with A=0, supported by the empirical evidence].  The results from 
the tests of the profit maximizing conditions are presented in Table 6. This table contains the 
following information. The first two columns correspond to the tests of the null hypothesis that 
the shares of inputs costs for labor and IT capital, respectively, are equal to estimated 
elasticity of production to the use of the input. The other two columns refer to the results 
from the tests of the optimal conditions for branches and advertising capital. The first row 
shows the estimated contributions to production and to demand of the respective input 
(elasticity and ratios of elasticity properly weighted) together with their estimated standard 
deviation (in brackets); the second row shows the average (and standard deviation in 
brackets) across banks of the shares of production input costs over total operating costs and 
the ratios of costs of value enhancing inputs over total interests rates in loans and deposits; 
the third row presents the estimated average and standard deviations of differences in value 
                                                                          
27. Part of this growth may also reflect the increase in human capital resulting from better education and training 
of workers. Notice, however, that real labor cost per worker remains rather stable over time (Table 3). 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 26 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0740 
contribution and cost shares / ratios (from rows one and two); finally row four shows the 
p-value from the test of the null hypothesis that each difference in row three is equal to zero. 
The estimated elasticity of 0.867 for labour in the production function is close to 
the mean value of 0.868 for the average labour input share of total operating costs; the 
hypothesis of differences in the elasticity and share of labour costs being equal to zero is not 
statistically rejected (p-value close to 1). Therefore, the hypothesis that labour is used up to 
the point where productivity equals the marginal cost [equation (10)] can not be rejected. 
For IT capital, estimated elasticity and average cost share are, respectively, 0.212 and 0.132. 
The two estimated values differ more than in the case of the labour input but the statistical 
test of differences equal to zero [equation (9)] does not reject the null hypothesis either 
(p-value of 0.427). Therefore, considering the precision of the mean estimates (standard 
errors), the null hypothesis that the return from investment in IT capital is just equal to the user 
cost of the capital input cannot be rejected. This implies that the evidence found in this paper 
does not support the hypothesis that IT capital allows banks to gain a competitive advantage 
and earn extraordinary profits. The evidence would support the claim [Carr (2003)] that IT 
investments provide banks with standardized services, and no strategic differentiation is 
possible. Summarizing the results from Tables 4 and 6, the empirical analysis does not reject 
the null hypothesis that labour and IT capital contribute to the production of bank services, 
but their respective contribution to the output of the bank, valued at the marginal operating 
cost, is just equal to the share of the costs of the input in total cost. Therefore, neither of the 
two provides banks with externality effects or a competitive advantage (extraordinary profit). 
The last two columns of Table 6 present the results of the tests of profit maximizing 
decisions for branches and for advertising, the two inputs that contribute to increase the 
value (willingness to pay) of banking services. The method is the same as in columns one and 
two but now we tests the optimality conditions (7) and (8) of the theoretical model.  Taking 
into account the respective elasticity estimates from Table 5, together with the weights v 
obtained from bank data, the average contribution of branches and advertising capital to the 
value of banks’ services is estimated to be 0.116 and 0.056, respectively ( first row and 
columns three and four of Table 6).28 On the other hand, the respective average estimates 
or the ratio of input costs to revenues shown in row two of Table 6, for branches 
and advertising, are 0.118 and 0.018, respectively. The average ratio of costs to revenues for 
branches, physical capital, is quite close to estimated average contribution to value and this 
explains that the p-value from the test of differences equal to zero is close to one. In the case 
of advertising, the estimated average contribution and the average cost to revenue ratio differ 
in a larger amount (0.050 and 0.018, respectively) but, once we take into account the 
standard deviations, the hypothesis of differences equal to zero between contribution 
and ratio of cost of the input to total revenues is not rejected either (p-value of 0.123). 
The conclusion is, one again, that banks in the sample make investments in branches and 
in advertising that contribute to increase the value of banking services (Table 5) and the 
amounts invested are those that maximize profits, i.e., the marginal return from the asset 
invested is equal to the marginal costs (Table 6). 
                                                                          
28. The corresponding mean and standard deviation estimates of the distribution of the ratio between input and price 
demand elasticity that appear in the formula have been obtained applying the delta method. 
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5 Conclusion 
Little is known about the contribution of IT capital to the growth and profitability of banks. 
The stock of IT capital has been the only productive asset that has increased steadily 
during the period 1983 to 2003, among the Spanish banks studied in this paper. This occurs 
while total labour, physical capital and advertising capital of the banking industry remain 
constant or decrease, in real terms, over the same time period. According to the marginal 
rate of substitution between IT and labour estimated in the paper, a one-million euro 
increment in IT capital per bank implies a reduction of 25 workers per bank. IT capital 
contributes to the output produced by banks, and its growth explains up to one-third of the 
annual growth rate in the output of banks. However, no evidence is found that IT capital 
increases the demand for loans or the supply of deposits (value-enhancing input). Overall, the 
estimated contribution of IT capital to the output of banks is just what would be expected 
from the profit-maximizing condition of marginal productivity equal to marginal cost. 
Therefore, the demand for IT capital services by Spanish banks is just that predicted by the 
profit-maximizing conditions.29 
Together with the examination of contributions to the productivity and profitability 
of IT capital, this paper also provides evidence for the contribution of other inputs to 
the output and the demand for bank services. Particularly, it studies the role played by labour, 
physical capital (investment per branch and number of branches) and advertising capital on 
the demand and supply side of banking services. Furthermore, the estimations of the 
demand functions of services provide estimates of the price elasticity of loans and deposits. 
The empirical findings indicate that banks produce their output at branch level through 
a combination of services from labour and from IT capital, under a constant-returns-to-scale 
production function. The output from labour and IT capital cannot be expanded beyond the 
fixed capacity of the branch which, in turn, requires a fixed investment per branch. The output 
and inputs at bank level are just the product of output /inputs per branch times the number of 
branches; thus, the hypothesis of constant returns to scale at the bank level for the labour 
and IT capital cannot be rejected by the data. The results also indicate that the representative 
branch of banks does not operate at full capacity, but banks seem to open branches 
according to the profit-maximizing conditions of marginal return equal to the marginal cost of 
the investment. 
Advertising capital is relatively low in Spanish banks (for the median bank, around 
one-seventh of IT capital), and it remains rather stable over time, in real terms. Advertising 
capital increases the demand for loans, and the supply of deposits, at a given interest rate. 
The elasticity of the supply of deposits, with respect to advertising capital, is twice (22%) the 
elasticity of the demand loans (11%), which suggests that expenditure on advertising is 
more effective for attracting depositors than for attracting borrowers. The null hypothesis that 
observed advertising services consumed by banks are those predicted by a profit-maximizing 
model is not rejected. 
The paper also provides evidence that the representative bank faces an 
inelastic demand for loans and an inelastic supply of deposits (elasticity values equal 
                                                                          
29. This result is consistent with that found by Beccalli (2007), of no significant differences in the accounting rate of 
return among banks with different investment in IT capital. Presumably, each bank invests the profit-maximizing amount 
in each period of time. 
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to 5.3 and 2.3, respectively). The market power of the representative bank is lower in loans 
than in deposits, so that the bank earns a 19% gross margin in revenues from loans and 
a 44% gross margin in payments to deposits. These profit margins are computed after taking 
into account the long-term variable costs of labour and IT capital, but before the fixed cost 
resulting from investments in branches, before the user-cost of advertising capital, and before 
the provisions for credit risk. Consequently, market power does not necessarily imply 
extraordinary profits for banks, since gross profits may be just the amount needed to 
compensate for the user costs of physical capital and advertising, and for credit risk.30 
When estimates of elasticity of output and demand to inputs and prices are 
combined into tests of the profit-maximizing decisions of banks, the results do not allow us to 
reject the null hypothesis of efficient (profit-maximizing) allocation of resources. This is 
contrary to the evidence found in the literature on returns from IT investment, which suggests 
underinvestment in this input [Litchenberg (1995); Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1995 and 1996)]. 
However, the results presented here are not easy to compare with previous studies, since this 
paper uses the econometric technique of system-GMM while other research uses OLS 
estimation, and our paper provides evidence that results are sensitive to the estimation 
methodology. 
One possible limitation of this paper, which should be taken into account in future 
research, is that the evaluation of profitability of the multi-asset banking firm is done under 
a static profit-maximization model, where capital accumulation is a dynamic process that 
should be modelled in a dynamic way. Another extension could be to more fully account for 
differences in the risk-taking behaviour of banks, in line with the analysis of Hughes, Lang, 
Mester and Moon (1996), who explicitly account for risk differences in the evaluation of the 
productive efficiency of banks. 
                                                                          
30. For the median bank in the sample in terms of size (loans plus deposits), the average estimated gross profits are 
very close to the sum of yearly average cost of physical capital, advertising, and loan-loss provisions, consistent with 
long-term zero economic profits. 
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TABLE 1.- AVERAGE, MEDIAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF OUTPUT PER BANK ( CONSTANT EUROS OF YEAR 1983). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Loans (Deposits) are the stock of loans (deposits) of the bank at the end of the year, at constant prices of 1983. Commissions is the present value, at 1983 prices, of a permanent flow 
of net commissions with nominal equal to the commissions earned by the bank in year t; the discount factor is the interbank interest rate in year t. 
 
Mean Median Sd. Deviation Mean Median Sd. Deviation
1983 159 1,120,007 403,561 2,187,840 1,164,856 412,462 2,345,536
1984 160 1,138,779 416,151 2,191,791 1,186,270 422,382 2,349,813
1985 162 1,148,951 434,779 2,160,143 1,200,273 439,748 2,318,865
1986 162 1,164,209 454,689 2,138,133 1,220,117 458,407 2,300,782
1987 161 1,239,968 484,768 2,200,911 1,296,136 490,361 2,365,999
1988 159 1,290,666 534,114 2,194,100 1,352,672 540,879 2,355,849
1989 159 1,380,761 550,720 2,323,877 1,446,267 560,894 2,507,772
1990 150 1,471,112 569,539 2,412,645 1,546,970 579,149 2,619,791
1991 145 1,609,639 646,756 2,553,927 1,704,658 661,502 2,779,383
1992 141 1,600,186 659,598 2,489,010 1,697,967 674,361 2,702,549
1993 139 1,653,833 679,729 2,514,269 1,776,774 714,175 2,738,817
1994 135 1,754,729 743,655 2,597,300 1,890,342 793,177 2,831,282
1995 136 1,812,553 758,112 2,659,866 1,936,350 777,637 2,885,500
1996 131 1,922,542 823,868 2,696,653 2,099,930 909,653 2,957,001
1997 129 2,058,575 918,908 2,782,326 2,310,736 1,017,936 3,082,136
1998 122 2,242,385 1,005,400 2,925,271 2,583,299 1,145,080 3,294,184
1999 118 2,388,333 1,107,300 3,003,312 2,795,124 1,387,997 3,363,937
2000 109 2,631,331 1,301,833 3,178,028 2,936,570 1,654,090 3,481,009
2001 104 2,927,504 1,600,197 3,303,000 3,276,334 1,892,592 3,608,268
2002 98 3,260,012 2,029,383 3,412,893 3,657,103 2,257,721 3,730,145
2003 91 3,673,169 2,334,357 3,552,218 4,269,484 2,995,222 3,913,026
Average cumulative growth
1983-1989 0.00% 3.49% 5.18% 3.61% 5.12%
1989-1994 -3.27% 4.79% 6.01% 5.36% 6.93%
1994-1999 -2.69% 6.17% 7.96% 7.82% 11.19%
1999-2003 -6.50% 10.76% 18.65% 10.59% 19.23%
1983-2003 -2.79% 5.94% 8.78% 6.49% 9.91%
Number of 
Banks
LOANS + DEPOSITS LOANS + DEPOSITS + COMMISSIONS
Year
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TABLE 2.- STATISTICS OF BANKS’ INPUTS IN THE YEARS 1983-2003 (Values per bank) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All variables are at end-of-year values. Monetary variables refer to replacement cost of the asset, in thousands of euros, in 1983. Physical capital includes tangible assets recorded in 
the balance sheet, plus an estimate of the replacement cost of the rented branches. Advertising capital is obtained through the permanent-inventory method, applied to yearly 
expenditures on advertising. IT capital includes IT assets reported in the balance sheet, and the stock calculated applying the permanent-inventory method to the flow of IT 
expenditures in the income statement. See appendix for additional details. 
 
 
 
Mean Median Sd. Dev. Mean Median Sd. Dev. Mean Median Sd. Dev. Mean Median Sd. Dev. Mean Median Sd. Dev.
1983 32,932 13,274 48,459 138 78 198 1,749 652 2,617 3,472 1,245 5,873 1,151 516 1,918
1984 33,673 14,410 48,085 145 83 207 1,761 724 2,526 4,032 1,646 6,289 1,129 499 1,761
1985 31,453 14,720 44,359 147 83 212 1,762 727 2,468 5,192 2,422 7,753 1,089 496 1,628
1986 30,576 14,546 43,272 136 85 173 1,807 811 2,512 5,804 2,790 8,309 1,028 492 1,492
1987 29,340 13,662 41,021 147 89 200 1,949 924 2,702 7,063 3,485 9,718 1,055 506 1,548
1988 31,490 13,821 47,165 147 93 194 2,096 943 2,875 8,142 4,113 10,406 1,052 531 1,509
1989 31,878 13,831 47,463 153 97 201 2,284 930 3,158 10,048 4,758 13,429 1,131 519 1,688
1990 34,329 16,453 48,292 167 100 225 2,665 946 3,738 12,125 5,413 16,515 1,216 584 1,803
1991 38,290 17,237 53,655 176 104 237 2,968 1,168 4,231 13,072 5,793 17,003 1,309 605 1,955
1992 38,419 18,500 52,481 169 106 210 2,658 1,076 3,422 13,653 5,753 18,690 1,283 599 1,858
1993 45,903 20,249 70,854 183 106 244 2,784 1,040 3,735 15,094 5,857 23,440 1,313 594 1,938
1994 48,836 20,082 77,001 191 108 252 2,844 1,187 3,798 16,053 6,555 24,402 1,328 593 1,910
1995 48,676 20,155 78,190 193 109 258 2,908 1,226 3,916 16,443 6,958 24,467 1,315 594 1,907
1996 51,093 22,795 76,541 203 114 272 3,152 1,330 4,228 17,468 7,480 24,689 1,354 617 1,932
1997 48,159 22,795 67,952 211 116 284 3,285 1,342 4,317 20,887 9,462 32,448 1,351 625 1,879
1998 45,506 23,114 58,880 249 122 377 3,526 1,450 4,697 23,132 11,023 36,520 1,554 674 2,457
1999 48,476 22,325 71,926 242 121 344 3,601 1,652 4,991 23,999 12,277 36,590 1,534 637 2,396
2000 41,725 21,330 52,966 236 129 309 3,564 1,631 4,509 25,375 12,507 38,376 1,425 672 1,897
2001 42,215 21,723 52,586 253 142 326 3,763 1,884 4,566 27,931 14,956 40,061 1,524 765 1,991
2002 53,091 21,096 86,809 285 166 379 3,964 1,915 4,843 32,337 15,604 49,060 1,687 869 2,272
2003 55,033 25,088 85,977 311 187 389 4,149 2,358 4,932 34,208 15,470 50,545 1,815 900 2,331
Average cumulative growth
1983-1989 -0.54% 0.69% 1.70% 3.63% 4.45% 5.91% 17.71% 22.34% -0.28% 0.10%
1989-1994 8.53% 7.46% 4.46% 2.15% 4.38% 4.87% 9.37% 6.41% 3.21% 2.67%
1994-1999 -0.15% 2.12% 4.73% 2.19% 4.72% 6.61% 8.04% 12.55% 2.87% 1.42%
1999-2003 3.17% 2.92% 6.29% 10.99% 3.54% 8.90% 8.86% 5.78% 4.21% 8.66%
1983-2003 2.57% 3.18% 4.07% 4.37% 4.32% 6.42% 11.44% 12.60% 2.28% 2.78%
Year
ADVERTISING IT NUMBER WORKERSPHYSICAL NUMBER BRANCHES
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TABLE 3.- STATISITICS OF COST OF EQUITY, USER COST OF CAPITAL, COST OF LABOUR, AND REPRESENTATIVE 
INTEREST RATE OF LOANS AND DEPOSITS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cost of equity is the real risk-adjusted financial opportunity cost of equity. User cost of capital is the nominal cost of equity plus the depreciation rate and less the growth rate of the 
assets’price. See appendix for a more detailed exposition of hypotheses used in the elaboration of bank-level data. Labour cost per worker is calculated as personnel expenditures 
divided by number of workers, expressed in thousands of constant euros, in 1983. The interest rate columns contain the interest rate averages of representative banking products in 
real terms ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+
+
CPI
i
1
1 *100: credit lines, receivables, mortgages and personal credits for loans; deposits, and REPO operations for deposits. Interest rate database begins in 1988. 
 
 
Mean Sd. Dev. Mean Sd. Dev. Mean Sd. Dev. Mean Sd. Dev. Mean Median Sd. Dev. Mean Median Sd. Dev. Mean Median Sd. Dev.
1983 0.13 0.03 0.19 0.03 0.48 0.02 0.60 0.02 14.16 14.05 2.49
1984 0.14 0.03 0.20 0.03 0.49 0.02 0.60 0.02 14.57 13.90 5.93
1985 0.15 0.03 0.21 0.03 0.50 0.02 0.59 0.02 15.32 14.42 8.88
1986 0.13 0.03 0.19 0.03 0.48 0.02 0.57 0.02 17.19 16.11 5.26
1987 0.16 0.02 0.22 0.03 0.51 0.02 0.56 0.02 18.22 17.34 5.15
1988 0.15 0.02 0.21 0.03 0.50 0.02 0.55 0.02 19.34 17.47 6.80 109.7 109.6 1.10 104.1 104.2 2.01
1989 0.14 0.02 0.20 0.02 0.49 0.01 0.56 0.01 19.84 18.19 7.96 108.8 108.9 0.93 103.4 103.6 1.96
1990 0.14 0.02 0.20 0.02 0.49 0.01 0.56 0.01 19.05 17.62 5.95 110.1 110.1 1.06 104.2 104.4 1.65
1991 0.14 0.02 0.19 0.02 0.49 0.01 0.55 0.01 18.25 17.63 4.29 110.3 110.4 1.22 104.5 104.8 1.34
1992 0.14 0.02 0.19 0.02 0.49 0.01 0.55 0.01 18.35 17.26 4.70 109.7 109.7 1.09 104.9 105.0 1.04
1993 0.14 0.02 0.19 0.02 0.49 0.01 0.54 0.01 18.65 17.57 4.87 110.2 110.1 1.27 105.9 106.0 0.66
1994 0.12 0.02 0.17 0.02 0.47 0.01 0.52 0.01 18.33 17.59 3.49 106.7 106.6 1.47 102.6 102.6 0.38
1995 0.12 0.02 0.17 0.02 0.47 0.01 0.52 0.01 19.11 17.23 10.22 107.4 107.2 1.36 103.5 103.6 0.54
1996 0.13 0.02 0.18 0.02 0.48 0.01 0.51 0.01 18.18 17.22 4.08 107.0 106.8 1.27 103.4 103.4 0.37
1997 0.12 0.02 0.17 0.02 0.47 0.01 0.49 0.01 18.51 17.21 4.63 106.0 105.9 1.19 102.9 103.0 0.35
1998 0.11 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.46 0.01 0.48 0.01 19.00 17.60 5.25 104.9 104.9 1.15 101.9 101.9 0.28
1999 0.10 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.45 0.01 0.47 0.01 19.64 18.26 7.62 103.4 103.4 1.23 100.2 100.2 0.22
2000 0.09 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.44 0.01 0.47 0.01 19.61 17.77 10.56 103.5 103.5 0.93 100.2 100.3 0.31
2001 0.10 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.44 0.01 0.48 0.01 19.22 18.15 4.67 103.3 103.2 1.01 100.2 100.3 0.29
2002 0.10 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.44 0.01 0.47 0.01 19.47 18.52 4.48 103.1 103.1 1.17 99.9 100.0 0.19
2003 0.09 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.44 0.01 0.47 0.01 18.83 17.78 3.58 102.6 102.5 1.28 99.5 99.5 0.28
Average of the period
1983-1988 0.14 0.03 0.20 0.03 0.49 0.02 0.58 0.02 16.47 15.55 5.75
1989-1993 0.14 0.02 0.19 0.02 0.49 0.01 0.55 0.01 18.83 17.65 5.55 109.8 109.8 1.11 104.6 104.8 1.33
1994-1998 0.12 0.02 0.17 0.02 0.47 0.01 0.50 0.01 18.63 17.37 5.53 106.4 106.3 1.29 102.9 102.9 0.38
1999-2003 0.09 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.44 0.01 0.47 0.01 19.35 18.10 6.18 103.2 103.1 1.12 100.0 100.0 0.26
1983-2003 0.13 0.02 0.18 0.02 0.47 0.01 0.53 0.01 18.23 17.09 5.75 106.68 106.62 1.17 102.58 102.66 0.74
COST OF EQUITY
DEPOSIT INTEREST 
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TABLE 4.- PRODUCTION FUNCTION ESTIMATION. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. The dependent variable is the log of the sum of loans and deposits from Table 1.ρ is the coefficient associated with the persistence of production shocks, and Labor, Physical 
Capital, Number Branches , IT capital stand for the number of workers, physical capital, number of branches and IT capital (all of them in logs), respectively. The model has been 
estimated using a two-step procedure. In the first step, we estimate the unrestricted model (equation 18) with the GMM system estimator, and in the second step we apply the 
minimum distance estimator to obtain the estimates of the restricted model imposing the COMFAC restrictions (equation 16). In this table, we show the estimations of the restricted 
model. The instruments used in the GMM estimation for the first-differenced equation are the levels of the explanatory variables in the periods t-2 and t-3, and for the levels equation 
are the first-differences of the explanatory variables in periods t-1 and t-2. In the last column (III), the number of workers and the IT capital are divided by the number of branches, to 
test if the total output of the bank can be written as the output per branch times the number of branches. All the estimations are performed with time dummy variables (coefficients not 
shown). We also show: the p-values of the Sargan test of the absence of autocorrelation (unrestricted estimation), and the p-values of the validity of the COMFAC restrictions and of 
the existence of Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) (restricted estimation). 
(*)=significant at 10% (**)= significant at 5%  (***)= significant at 1%; standard errors in parentheses. 
a We introduce Labor and IT capital per branch. The p-value of CRS refers to the test of constant returns at branch level (Ho≡ bn+bkIT = 1). 
.
ρ 0.908 *** 0.879 *** 0.888 ***
Labor 0.867 *** 0.828 *** 0.803 ***
Physical Capital -0.082  
Number Branches 0.986 ***
IT capital 0.212 ** 0.217 ** 0.205 **
Sargan 0.127 0.206 0.235
2ndautocorrelation 0.110 0.128 0.129
COMFAC 0.259 0.961 0.958
CRS 0.576 0.798 0.981
N.Observations 2646 2646 2646
 (III)a (II)(I)
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TABLE 5.- ESTIMATIONS OF DEMAND FOR LOANS AND OF SUPPLY OF DEPOSITS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The dependent variable is the log of loans and the log of deposits.ρ is the coefficient associated with the persistence of the 
demand shocks, and il, id, Branches, Advertising Capital, and IT capital are the interest rate of loans, interest rate of deposits, 
number of branches, advertising capital and IT capital (all of them in logs), respectively. The model has been estimated using a 
two-step procedure. In the first step, we estimate the unrestricted model with the GMM system estimator, and in the second step 
we apply the minimum distance estimator to obtain the estimates of the restricted model imposing the COMFAC restrictions. In 
this table, we show the estimations of the restricted model. The instruments used in the GMM estimation in the first-differenced 
equation are the levels of the explanatory variables in the periods t-2 and t-3, and in the levels equation are the first-differences of 
the explanatory variables in periods t-1 and t-2. In the case of interest rates and branches, the instruments have been substituted by 
the residuals from the production function (Table 4) and the predicted number of branches as a function of the number of workers 
and IT capital at the bank level. All the estimations are performed with time dummy variables (coefficients not shown). We also 
show: the p-values of the Sargan test of the absence of autocorrelation (unrestricted estimation) and the p-values of the validity of 
the COMFAC restrictions.   
(*)=significant at 10% (**)= significant at 5%  (***)= significant at 1%; standard errors in parentheses 
ρ 0.972 *** 0.977 ***
i l -5.177 **
i d 2.323 **
Branches 0.361 *** 0.438 ***
Advertising Capital 0.110 ** 0.221 ***
IT Capital 0.003 -0.010
COMFAC  restrictions 0.850 0.199
Sargan Test 0.965 1.000
2nd order autocorrelation 0.035 0.238
3rd order autocorrelation 0.288 0.213
N.Observations 1606 1560
(0.029)
(0.093)
(0.050)
(0.031)
(0.066)
(0.085)
DEMAND OF LOANS SUPPLY OF DEPOSITS
(0.013)
(2.425)
(0.019)
(1.030)
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TABLE 6.-TEST OF CONDITIONS OF OPTIMAL (PROFIT-MAXIMIZING) EXPENDITURES IN BANKS’ INPUTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table presents the results of testing equations (9) and (10), in columns of Labour and IT, and equations (7) and (8), in columns of Branches and Advertising, from the profit 
maximizing decisions of the representative bank. The numbers shown in the table are estimated means and standard errors. When apply, the mean and standard error of the statistical 
distribution of ratios involving means and standard errors of parameter estimates from Table 5, have been obtained applying the delta method.  
 
Labour IT Branches Advertising
0.867 0.212 0.116 0.050
(0.137) (0.100) (0.035) (0.021)
0.868 0.132 0.118 0.018
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001)
-0.001 0.079 -0.002 0.032
(0.137) (0.100) (0.035) (0.021)
      P value 0.995 0.427 P value 0.949 0.123
VALUE ENHANCING RESOURCESPRODUCTION RESOURCES
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Appendix 1: Summary of methodology used to estimate the stock of material and 
immaterial assets and user cost of capital for Spanish banks 
For each bank, data are available on the year-by-year investment flow in Physical assets, 
Advertising and IT. Data are obtained from confidential accounting statements reported by 
banks to the Banco de España. The stock of a particular asset in year t, at current 
replacement cost, is obtained applying the permanent inventory method. 
Let It be the gross investment flow of new capital services in year t; Kt the stock of 
homogeneous capital services at the end of year t; φ the depreciation rate of the asset used in 
production activities during a one-year period; µ the rate of technological progress 
incorporated into capital services invested during one year, with respect to those invested 
one year before, and let qt be the price of one unit of services in period t. The permanent 
inventory method determines the replacement cost of the stock in year t as follows, 
( )11
11
1
−−
−
⋅⋅⋅+
−+= tt
t
t
tttt Kpp
pIpKp µ
φ
 (1) 
To replace in t one unit of capital service in place at the end of the previous year, t-1, 
with the technical progress in capital goods of the period, only 1/(1+µ) units are needed. 
Depreciation implies that for each unit of capital in place in t-1, there is only (1-φ) units 
remaining at the end of the year. This computation of the net capital services is exact when 
the depreciation of the asset is exponential at rate φ. 
The term (1-φ)/(1+µ) is substituted by (1-δ) where δ is the overall economic 
depreciation rate. The value of δ  is set to 0.03 for buildings, 0.15 for fixed assets different 
from IT, 0.35 for IT capital, and 0.35 for advertising capital. These are values in line with 
others used in the literature. The price index of buildings is taken from the Ministerio de 
Fomento and the price index of other non-IT fixed capital is set equal to the price deflator of 
gross capital formation. We assume that the price index of quality-adjusted IT capital is zero, 
and the price index of advertising capital is the price of market services published by the 
Spanish Institute of Statistics. The zero inflation rate of the price of IT capital services departs 
from the 15% to 20% decline assumed in other studies with US data, Litchenberg (1995), 
because, in Spain, general inflation is much higher than in the US, and technological 
innovations are introduced at a later time. 
The user cost of capital represents the rental price per unit of service the firm would 
pay in the case that the unit of service was rented in the market. Even though capital services 
are supplied internally, we assume that there is an opportunity cost for one unit of service 
equal to the rental price. For capital service K, the user cost is given by ( )kk pC ?−+= δα , 
where α is the financial opportunity cost of capital, δ is the depreciation rate defined earlier, 
and kp?  is the rate of change in price of the asset during the period (asset-specific inflation). 
The calculation of the user cost of capital requires us to knowα. Since the paper 
assumes that material and immaterial operating assets are financed by equity, the estimated 
cost of α is set equal to the estimated cost of equity for each bank. This, in turn, is set equal 
to the interest rate charged for loans by the bank, plus a financial risk premium that is 
inversely related to the proportion of capital to total assets of the bank. 
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For a more detailed explanation of the methodology for both, replacement 
costs of invested assets, and user cost of capital, see Martin-Oliver, Salas-Fumás and 
Saurina (2007b). 
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Appendix 2: First order conditions of the profit maximizing problem 
If λ is the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint, the first order conditions of the 
profit-maximizing problem are written as, 
 
λ=−⎟⎟⎠
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(A.2) 
( ) ( ) 0'' =−−−+−− ckckckdckl pcDriLmr λλ  (A.3) 
( ) ( ) 0''' =+−−−+−− ikikikikdikl FpcDriLmr λλλ  (A.4) 
( ) ( ) 0'' =−−−+−− bbkbdbl pkcDriLmr λλ  (A.5) 
- 0
' =+ NFw λ  (A.6) 
 
Where el and ed are, respectively, the absolute value of the price elasticity of 
demand for loans, and the elasticity of supply of deposits (positive); ( )( )αaaim +−⋅= 1  is the 
financial opportunity cost of loans. The Lagrange multiplier is the change in the profit of 
the bank from a marginal increase in the output produced. From (A.1) and (A.2), we obtain 
equation (6) in the main text; (A.3) and (A.5) justify equations (7) and (8), while equations (9), 
(10) come from (A4),(A6). 
For variables in their optimal values, from (A.4) and (A.6) the optimal value of the 
Lagrange multiplier is given by: 
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Where ac is the average operating cost for the labour and IT capital inputs, 
DL
wNIKPc
ac ikik +
+= . The term in parenthesis in the equation that determines the value of λ,is 
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the weighted sum of loan demand elasticity and of deposit supply elasticity with respect to  IT 
capital (ΣL,IK , ΣD,IK), each divided by the respective price elasticity (loan and deposit); the 
weighting factors are the volume of loans and deposits per unit of total output, 
DL
LsL += ; 
LD ss −=1 . Consequently, the optimal value of λ is equal to the marginal cost of one 
additional unit of output, ac , minus the marginal benefit in terms of higher customer value 
from a one-unit increase in IT capital. If the external or demand effects from investing in IT 
capital do not exist, then the multiplier is just equal to the marginal operating cost of the bank 
in terms of the cost of labour and the cost of IT capital. Finite, non-negative profits require 
optimal λ to be positive, so we assume that this holds for the relevant range of parameters. 
In this model, the profit-maximizing interest rates of loans and deposits satisfy the 
condition that ( )[ ] λα =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−=+−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
d
d
l
l e
riaai
e
r 11111  [equations (A.1) and (A.2)]. Marginal 
revenue of loans ( )[ ] λα ++− aai 1  is equal to marginal financial costs plus net operating 
costs. Therefore, (A.1) is just the condition that marginal revenue equals marginal cost. 
Equation (A.2) is the same as (A.1) but for deposits, where marginal revenue is the market 
rate i. 
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